In the aftermath of the Crimea annexation in March 2014, the idea of 'hybrid warfare' quickly gained prominence as a concept that could help to explain the success of Russian military operations in this conflict.
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victory there had taken the world by surprise. This was not least due to the fact that it stood in stark contrast to previous military campaigns, such as those in Chechnya and Georgia, which were fought by conventional means and often criticised for the excessive use of force.
'Hybrid warfare' was useful to highlight how Russia's approach in Crimea differed from previous, less successful wars. However, some observers and even policy makers quickly jumped to the conclusion that with 'hybrid warfare' Russia had found a 'new art of war' that made up for its shortcomings in conventional capabilities and posed a significant threat to the West (Jones 2014 Commons 2014, p. 12) . Describing Russia's approach as 'ambiguous warfare' before 'hybrid warfare' emerged as the most prominent label in subsequent months, the report recommended that in response to this challenge NATO should 'create an Alliance doctrine for "ambiguous warfare" and make the case for investment in an Alliance asymmetric or "ambiguous warfare" capability ' (ibid, p. 44) . Lebanon war. What makes a war 'hybrid', is the coordinated and combined use of different modes of warfare, both military (use of force) and non-military (irregular tactics, criminal disorder, terrorist acts, et cetera) to achieve 'synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict' within the main battlespace (Hoffman 2007, p. 8) . At the time of Hoffman's writing, 'hybrid warfare' was only one of many related labels, which also included 'new wars', 'fourth-generation warfare' and 'asymmetric warfare' amongst others. These were being coined by analysts in an effort to conceptualise changes in 4 contemporary warfare based on the idea that war had become 'substantially distinct' from older patterns of conflict (Berdal 2011, pp. 109-10) . All of these labels are contested and have been criticised subsequently for lacking historical and international context in portraying a straightforward division between 'new' wars and warfare and 'traditional' inter-state conflicts fought by conventional means (Strachan & Scheipers 2011, pp. 18-20) . In the aftermath of the Crimea annexation in March 2014, the 'hybrid warfare' concept quickly gained traction, because it appeared to be particularly relevant to this operation where non-military tools, and the use of information in particular, played a central role. Few analysts applying the concept to Russia, however, have explicitly based their conclusions on Hoffmann's specific understanding of the term and instead have tended to refer loosely to the general idea of 'hybridity' as a mix of military and non-military tools. This has resulted in widely varying understandings and definitions of what exactly 'hybrid warfare' entails and enabled the extreme stretching of the concept ultimately to frame Russian foreign policy in general, as discussed in the article's final part.
Considering the concept's origins and its growing popularity in the aftermath of Crimea, it is important to bear in mind that it was made prominent by Western analysts and is not embedded in Russian military thinking. Although the term 'hybrid warfare' is now also often referred to by Russian authors, they mostly discuss it, as Keir Giles has observed, in reference to Western and US thinking on war, and not as a Russian approach (2016, p. 9) . A number of Russian commentators, moreover, have dismissed it as a Western invention used to discredit Russia. For example, writing about the 2015 Brussels Forum, Novaia gazeta journalist Aleksandr Mineev observed that 'in a global context, Russia was mentioned only in a negative sense. Today, the key concept instead of "Cold War" has become "Hybrid War" (2015, p. 6) . In an article entitled 'The myth of "hybrid war"', the military expert Ruslan Pukhov concluded that 'it is obvious that the term "hybrid warfare" is used as a propaganda device and not really a classification. This is because any attempt to define it ends with the conclusion that there really is nothing very new in the idea ' (2015) .
Following the Crimea annexation, a number of scholars tried to find evidence for an emerging Russian 'hybrid warfare' doctrine in the writings of Russian military thinkers in the years leading up to the crisis. In particular, a now well-known article authored by the Russian Chief of the General Staff, Valerii Gerasimov in 2013, in which he discussed the increasing importance of non-military tools in conflicts as an important element of change in the current operating environment, caught the attention of analysts (2013). Although neither 'hybrid warfare', nor Ukraine are mentioned in the article, Gerasimov was later identified as 'the face of the hybrid war approach' (Snegovaya 2015) . The designation of Gerasimov's article as the origin of Russian 'hybrid warfare' thinking has since been criticised as selective and mistaken by a number of authors (Giles 2016: 10) . Focusing on the Arab Spring and NATO's intervention in Libya, Gerasimov outlined his views on general trends in Western and US approaches to warfare, which he traces back to the 1991 Gulf War. As Charles Bartles' in-depth analysis of the article showed, rather than outlining Russian doctrine or future approaches, Gerasimov's discussion of the growing importance of non-military tools in warfare in fact described 'the primary threats to Russian sovereignty as stemming from USfunded social and political movements such as color revolutions, the Arab Spring, and the Maidan movement' (Bartles 2016 ; see also Persson 2013, 82) .
The audience to which Gerasimov's article was initially addressed casts further doubt on the idea that it outlined a new Russian 'hybrid warfare' doctrine that was subsequently tested in Ukraine, as noted by Ulrik Franke. Gerasimov's article was based on a speech he had presented to fellow officers in the Russian Academy of War Sciences. As such, it was intended as a provocative appeal to the military establishment for the need of innovation in military thinking as part of the wider modernisation of the Russian armed forces (Franke 2015, p. 41 that the success of a strategy is always context-dependent. As Strachan has put it, "Strategy is about doing things, about applying ends to means. It is an attempt to make concrete a set of objectives through the application of military force in a particular case" (2013, p. 13 ). This means that presumed 'silver bullets' like 'strategic bombing', 'network-centric warfare' and also 'hybrid warfare' are not a strategy in themselves, but merely means to an end (Strachan 2010, p. 158-9 ). An operational approach can be successful if it matches the objective to be achieved and the circumstances specific to a conflict, but it can never be a universal tool.
When it comes to evaluating the key to success of Russia's military operation in Crimea, it is clear that a suitable strategy, in Strachan's sense of the word, rather than the application of a universal war-winning formula was central. In Crimea, extremely favourable conditions meant that Russian tactics hit on fertile ground and the use of large-scale military force was simply not required in pursuit of its objectives (Norberg, Westerlund and Franke 2014, pp. 44-47) . As Nico Popescu has argued, favourable circumstances in Crimea meant that 'it was not only easy for Russia, it was almost effortless' (Popescu 2015, p. 2) . An important factor enabling Russian military success in Crimea, in addition to historical, ethnic and geopolitical issues specific to the region, was the element of surprise Russia achieved both vis-à-vis the Ukrainian government and the rest of the world. Using, for example, disinformation and diversions, such as unmarked soldiers posing as 'concerned civilians', the Ukrainian authorities and outside observers were left guessing about Russia's intentions and the course of events, at least in the crucial initial phases (Norberg 2014 into is difficult to predict today. (Gerasimov 2013) Exaggerating the extent to which the 'hybridity' of Russian tactics used in Crimea determined military success in this case obscures more than it can explain and it is also likely to preclude the flexibility of responses needed in any potential future Russian hostility. As Mark Galeotti cautioned, 'None of the current uses of Russian military power should be considered the standard blueprint. If they do anything direct in the Baltic States -and I don't actually think that they will -it will not be Crimea 2.0 or Donbass 2.0, but something that will be tailored to the situation there' (Galeotti 2015) . Indeed, it would be bad strategy on the part of Russia if its leadership simply tried to replicate the Crimea operation elsewhere.
Certainly, the element of surprise, which was central to success in Crimea, would be absent as any potential opponent would expect exactly that.
The circumstances specific to Crimea are also significant when it comes to estimating Russian information warfare capabilities and the country's ability to influence international public opinion. The centrality of information and propaganda in the Crimea operation is one of the reasons for why the 'hybrid warfare' concept has become so prominent. Based on the perceived success of Russian information operations in this case -later famously termed 'the 9 most amazing information blitzkrieg…in the history of information warfare' by NATO SACEUR Philip Breedlove (quoted in Thornton 2015, p. 40 ) -some analysts concluded that this Russian 'hybrid' tool posed a fundamental threat to the West. As Giles put it, for example, 'Russia has built up a highly developed information warfare arsenal NATO and EU are currently unable to compete with' (Giles 2015) . In Rod Thornton's words, 'the major threat to Western interests anywhere in the world is not terrorism, it is the threat posed by information warfare such as that recently conducted by Russia. It has achieved clear results, and this success can be repeated' (Thornton 2015, p. 45) .
Even a cursory look into military history shows that conclusions about Russian 'information warfare' prowess based on evidence from the Crimea operation should be treated with caution. After all, approaches to warfare relying heavily on the achievement of information and morale effects on civilian populations have rarely delivered consistent success.
Counterinsurgency warfare is a good example in this respect. This rose to prominence in the mid-2000s as a concept that would help make wars like those in Afghanistan and Iraq more 'winnable' for the US. It was based on the premise that technological superiority and conventional military force was of limited utility or could even be counterproductive in conflicts where support of the local population was essential. Instead, knowledge of culture, traditions and history would be used to influence and convince the civilian population that denying support for insurgents was in their best interest. As the experience of the drawn-out campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have showed, 'winning hearts and minds' was clearly easier said than done (Egnell 2010) . In a study of the implications for US defence policy of 'grey zone wars', a concept that is sometimes used as an alternative to the 'hybrid warfare' idea, Echevarria cautioned that coercive practices using information and communications are never straightforward. In his words, such practices are 'vulnerable to mirror-imaging, or projecting one's values and ways of thinking onto one's adversaries. Such projections lead to risky assumptions about what one's rivals hold dear and how they will behave' (Echevarria 2015, p. 18) . The fact that influencing enemy populations through information has been historically difficult is significant for the estimation of Russian 'information warfare' capabilities, especially on an international level. Favourable circumstances specific to Crimea in the form of intimate knowledge of local sentiments meant that Russian 'information warfare' in this case was also effortless. Russia correctly estimated that it could rely on a predominantly ethnic Russian population that would happily agree with its narrative of events and not be too concerned whether the portrayal of the Maidan protestors as fascists or the idea that Russia was merely protecting ethnic Russians and Russian speakers corresponded to the truth. Given the overwhelming referendum vote in favour of becoming a part of Russiaeven if the results were skewed -it is also clear that the ethnic Russian majority in Crimea required little convincing that the annexation was in their best interest.
As discussed in more detail in the article's final section, it is not in doubt that various information tools used by Russia to seek international influence, including the much- In the view of some observers, the skilful application of non-military instruments in Crimea enabled Russia to achieve an almost bloodless victory, in stark contrast to previous military interventions that largely unsuccessfully relied on the use of brute force. In line with this thinking, an argument has been made that a major lesson to be learned from Crimea is the development in Russian strategic thinking and doctrine of 'contactless' warfare in which the use of force would play a secondary role. In the words of Thornton, the innovation in Russia's approach to warfare was 'to remove, as far as possible, displays of "hard military power" from modern warfare, with "war" becoming something fought at "arm's length" without the need to engage with an adversary's forces ' (2015, p. 44) . Similarly, Janis Berzinš argued that the 'new generation warfare' Russia tested in Crimea was based on the 'idea that "supreme excellence" consists of breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting' (2014).
This new approach would be particularly hard for Western powers to respond, as it allows Russia to 'negate the significant advantage held by the US and its NATO allies in terms of their conventional military force, mostly in the technological realm' (Thornton 2015, p. 44) .
It is true that in Crimea advanced technology or indeed the use of military force per se played a limited role. However, as discussed above, this was not the result of strategic innovation, but because favourable circumstances in this case meant that a large-scale military campaign simply was not required in the first place. The idea that Russia's view of the future is one of contactless war where 'the main battlespace is in the mind' (Berzinš 2014 ) and actual military force will take on a secondary role does not accurately reflect the direction of ongoing Russian military modernisation. In this sense, the 'hybrid warfare' concept with its strong focus on non-military tools and approaches might lead to a skewed understanding of Russian military capabilities and ambitions. Russian military exercises, the scale and volume of which also has increased considerably in the last few years, moreover, have not trained troops for 'hybrid' or 'contactless' political warfare, but on the converse, as Johan Norberg showed in an extensive study of such exercises, 'to launch and fight largescale joint inter-service operations, i.e. launching and waging interstate wars' (2015, p. 5).
There is nothing in contemporary Russian strategic thought to suggest that the use of force and military technology is now seen as secondary, or that the country is 'increasingly focusing on new forms of politically-focused operations in the future', as Galeotti claimed (2014). As Bukkvoll demonstrated in a study of Russian military thinking, all major schools of thought, which he loosely grouped into the 'traditionalists', 'modernisers' and 'revolutionaries' agree that advanced lethal weaponry is of central importance, although they differ in their views on the degree to which this should impact on manpower requirements (Bukkvoll 2011) . Even those Russian strategic thinkers that are often hailed as the architects of Russian 'hybrid warfare' thinking emphasise technology and lethal force in their writing. This is true for Gerasimov's abovementioned article and also for a much-discussed piece 
So what lessons can we learn from Crimea?
There are a number of lessons we can learn from Crimea. However, they are a lot more modest than often implied by proponents of the 'hybrid warfare' concept. First, the operations, where airborne units acted with rapid-reaction forces from the special-forces reconnaissance brigades and marine infantry, demonstrated that the aim of improving rapid reaction capabilities has borne fruits. The operations also showcased the effectiveness of Russia's newly created Special Operations Forces (SOF), which were deployed with high speed and to great effect (Nikolsky 2014) . It is important to bear in mind, however, that Nuclear deterrence is likely to stay at the core of Russia's defence against the West for the foreseeable future, because this is the only area where Russia can truly compete (Lecik 2014 ).
In some way perhaps, what is more significant than the military capabilities displayed in
Crimea is the demonstration of a new-found confidence in using the country's armed forces.
This became even more evident with Russia's intervention in Syria, which showed that the country was now able and willing to use its military in expeditionary operations outside of the former Soviet region for the first time in post-Soviet history. The fact that it chose to do so in the form of a conventional air campaign not dissimilar to Western air operations pursued over the past two decades further indicates that 'hybrid warfare' as its new weapon 15 of choice. Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea have understandably led to fears that its threshold to use military force has been lowered. However, limitations of its conventional capabilities mean that it is likely to refrain from engagement in out-of-area operations beyond the post-Soviet space where there would be a risk of this leading to a direct military confrontation with the US or with NATO.
'Hybrid warfare' and Russian foreign policy
In the aftermath of the Crimea annexation, 'hybrid warfare' has evolved from a military concept describing an operational approach to warfare into an idea that is now routinely used to describe Russian foreign policy in general. It is not uncommon to encounter the assertion that Russia is engaged in a campaign of hybrid warfare against the West. As Thornton asserted, 'the West must adjust to the situation in which it now finds itself in relation to Russian 'hybrid warfare' capabilities plays directly into Putin's hands.
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The claim that Russia is waging a 'hybrid war' against the West suggests that Russia is doing so in pursuit of a specific strategic goal. These goals are rarely specified when such arguments are made. Abovementioned NATO Parliamentary Assembly report discussing Russian 'hybrid warfare' as a new strategic challenge explicitly stated that 'the grand strategic vision driving Russia's actions remain unclear' (Miranda Calha, 2015, p. 1).
Cederberg and Eronen assert that 'hybrid' tools used against the West 'serve Moscow's political goals', but they fail to consider what exactly these goals might be (2015) . discourse: 'we are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence -on intimidation instead of free choice, on guerrillas by night instead of armies by day. It is a system which has conscripted vast human and material resources into the building of a tightly knit, highly efficient machine that combines military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, scientific and political operations' (Kennedy 1961) . As it turned out, the Soviet leadership's centralisation and strategic foresight was not as strong as had been presumed. Rather than a realistic assessment of Soviet strategic ambitions and capabilities, the West's enemy image of the Soviet Union was at least partially a reflection of its own insecurities. This, as Fettweis noted, is a common pattern in international politics because 'people are aware of their own internal deliberations and divisions but see only the outcomes of decisions made elsewhere, which makes other actors seem unified and strategic ' (2015, p. 158) .
The apparent tendency to explain away every Russian foreign policy move as 'hybrid warfare' also overstates the newness of many of these actions where there is in fact a large degree of continuity. Russia used most of these perceived 'hybrid warfare' tactics already long before the Crimea crisis. For example, the discussion of cyber-attacks originating in unnecessarily militarises the language of international politics in an already tense situation.
The reason why 'hybrid warfare' is considered 'hybrid' in the first place is because it uses a mixture of both military and non-military approaches. In Crimea, the use of non-military means, such as information and disinformation, were important factors contributing to the achievement of objectives. However, Crimea was not 'won' by non-military means alone. that the Crimea annexation set a sign that it was time to 'accept the obvious fact: Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs. Like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected' (Putin 2014 It is clear why the 'hybrid warfare' label quickly gained in popularity as an analytical tool in the aftermath of the Crimea annexation. It helped to conceptualise how Russia's approach to this operation differed from previous interventions and highlighted the need to revise Western views of the Russian military. Up until this point, these views had been predominantly negative and clearly underestimated the ability of the Russian armed forces to approach a low-intensity conflict with anything other than brute force. Beyond this, however, the 'hybrid warfare' concept has done more harm than good to our understanding of developments in Russian military and defence policy as it neither explains the success of Russia's military operation in Crimea, nor does it adequately reflect the content and direction of ongoing military modernisation. Perhaps the 'hybrid warfare' discussion also served a purpose in drawing attention to the full range of instruments used by Russia today in pursuit of a clearly more forceful foreign policy. However, the implication that almost every Russian foreign policy move can now be explained as a part of a wider 'hybrid warfare' campaign is not useful. Referring to Russian actions ranging from the use of social media to military provocations as 'hybrid threats' not only exaggerates the notion of newness where there is in fact a high level of consistency. It also implies a consistency of effort and level of strategic foresight that is simply unrealistic and risks making Russia and its leadership look stronger than it actually is.
